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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wayne D. Anderson, II, asserts the district court abused its discretion in his postconviction proceeding when it denied his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant,
dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended petition,
because the district court did not recognize his right to self-representation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In an underlying criminal case, Canyon County No. CR 2011-31445,
Mr. Anderson was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and sentencing
enhancements on both counts. (R., pp.4, 80.) He entered an Alford plea1 to the lewd
conduct count and a previous sex offense conviction sentencing enhancement.
(R., p.80.)
Mr. Anderson later moved to withdraw the plea primarily on the basis of undue
coercion from his wife, and the district court denied the motion.

(R., p.80.)

Mr. Anderson then filed a motion to reconsider on the basis he was suffering from
undue mental duress and severe depression when he entered the plea, and his plea
was therefore not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. (R., pp.80-81.) The district court
denied the motion to reconsider. (R., p.81.) The district court sentenced Mr. Anderson
to a unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed.

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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(R., pp.4, 81.)

Mr. Anderson appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
district court. State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230 (Ct. App. 2014).
Mr. Anderson filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.

(R., pp.4-8.) Mr. Anderson asserted trial counsel “failed to

present available evidence from Canyon Co. Jail and Medical Center, of my suicidal
state . . . failed to present available testimony evidence from myself of my suicide
attempts, including on the day of plea,” and “failed to [counsel] me of need for
competency or mental health evaluation to [supply] to the court during withdrawal
[proceeding].” (See R., pp.5-6.)
In the attached Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition,
Mr. Anderson asserted that because of those failings, the State was able to prevail in its
argument that he was merely severely depressed, when he was in fact severely suicidal
and therefore rendered intellectually and constitutionally incapable of offering a
competent Alford plea. (See R., p.9.) Mr. Anderson had been placed on suicide watch
upon being booked into the Canyon County Jail, but the experience only compounded
his misery. (R., p.10.) He stated he learned there to not disclose or hint at his suicidal
ideation. (R., p.10.) After being released from suicide watch, he planned to hang
himself from the ceiling of his cell, but never made an earnest attempt. (R., p.10.)
When he was later placed in protective custody, he planned to hang himself in the
shower stalls and made several earnest attempts with that plan. (R., pp.10-11.)
Mr. Anderson also wrote that on the day he entered his Alford plea, he planned
to end his life after taking the weapon from the armed bailiff who was escorting him
back to jail from the hearing

(See R., pp.11-13.) Mr. Anderson stated he did not go
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through with that plan because there was a good chance he would have to hurt or kill
the bailiff. (R., p.13.)
Additionally, Mr. Anderson averred that it never occurred to his trial counsel to
request a competency or mental health evaluation, or that Mr. Anderson make any
mental or emotional issue known to the district court during the change of plea hearing.
(R., pp.13-14.)

He further stated trial counsel failed to present evidence of

Mr. Anderson’s suicidal ideation. (R., p.14.)
Mr. Anderson also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of
Counsel.

(R., pp.16-19.)

The district court entered an Order Appointing Counsel.

(R., pp.27-28.) The State then filed an Answer arguing that Mr. Anderson’s claims for
post-conviction relief should be denied and/or dismissed. (R., pp.29-32.)
The district court subsequently issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition.
(R., pp.80-91.) The district court stated Mr. Anderson “has presented no evidence that
his attorney should have been aware that Petitioner’s mental health was compromised
to the degree that would have rendered his plea invalid at the time he changed his plea,
other than his bare allegations which are rebutted by the Record.” (R., p.84.) The
district court determined Mr. Anderson “has failed to establish by admissible evidence,
deficient performance with respect to the failure to present evidence or request an
evaluation at the change of plea hearing.” (R., p.89.) The district court also stated it
would not consider Mr. Anderson’s claim to the extent it was alleging his plea was not
knowingly, intelligent, and voluntary separate from the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, because that claim had been decided on direct appeal. (R., p.89.)
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Regarding the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
testimony and evidence, the district court determined Mr. Anderson “has failed to
provide the Court with that evidence. Further, he has failed to show prejudice; that is,
that the court would have granted either his motion to withdraw or his motion to
reconsider if it had been presented with that evidence.” (R., p.89.) Thus, the district
court gave Mr. Anderson notice of its intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition, and
gave him twenty days to respond. (See R., pp.90, 95.)
Mr. Anderson’s appointed post-conviction counsel then filed a Motion for More
Time to Respond to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, based on counsel’s affidavit averring he
needed more time to find and interview potential witnesses Mr. Anderson had identified
to corroborate his state of mind at the time of the plea in the underlying criminal case.
(R., pp.91-94.) The district court issued an order giving Mr. Anderson approximately
twenty more days to file a response before the district court dismissed the petition.
(See R., pp.95-96.)
After that deadline passed, post-conviction counsel filed a Second Motion for
More Time to Respond to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, based on counsel’s affidavit
stating he needed more time to investigate potential witnesses, obtain a release of
medical information from Mr. Anderson, and pursue additional leads. (See R., pp.99101.)

The district court issued a second order, giving Mr. Anderson about thirty

additional days to respond. (See R., pp.102-03.)
Two days before the new deadline, Mr. Anderson filed, pro se, a “Motion to
Proceed Pro Se Litigant,” a “Motion to Extend Time to Prepare Petition,” and a “Motion
to Dismiss Court Appointed Counsel.” (See R., pp.104-06.) The first motion stated
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Mr. Anderson brought “his motion to proceed as his own Pro Se Litigant in further
litigation of his Post Conviction Relief.” (R., p.104.) The second motion stated he
brought a “motion to extend time to prepare petition in support of his Post Conviction
Relief with forthcoming [evidence] of additional witnesses, and documentation from both
Canyon County Medical and Detention Centers.” (R., pp.104-05.)
Mr. Anderson’s third motion, to dismiss court-appointed counsel, stated postconviction counsel “has provided me with Ineffective Assistance of [Counsel], in so far
as I have, as of this date, not [acquired] repeatedly requested documents from Canyon
County Medical and Detention Centers; key witnesses have either not been examined
or examined ineffectually and all requests [were] met with unreasonable delay leading
to repeated requests for extensions.” (R., p.105.)
The district court conducted a status conference nine days after the deadline,
where Mr. Anderson was not present but represented by post-conviction counsel. (See
R., p.107.) The district court expressed its “intention to deny the motions and dismiss
the petition. We’ve extended it a couple times.” (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.11-13.)
Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction counsel told the district court he had had some
conversations with Mr. Anderson and had his investigator check on some potential
witnesses. (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.15-17.) Post-conviction counsel stated, “I have
not discovered any good evidence upon which to base an Amended Petition.”
(Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.17-18.)

Post-conviction counsel further stated he had

advised Mr. Anderson “that this thing is probably—probably going to live or die based
on his own affidavit and his previous petition; that I was not going to file an amended
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one. Subsequently, he gave me some witnesses. I’ve checked on those. They don’t
change my position.” (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25.)
The district court determined “on the motion to extend time, he hasn’t provided
any facts to warrant an additional extension. It’s been extended twice already. So I’m
going to deny the motion to extend time.” (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.1-4.) The district
court continued: “Deny—he doesn’t really have a right to counsel on the post-conviction.
He can’t maintain a claim for ineffective assistance. I’m going to deny the motions.”
(Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.4-6.)
That same day, the district court issued an Order Denying Motions, denying
Mr. Anderson’s three motions “[f]or the reasons set forth at the hearing.” (R., pp.10819.) The district court also entered an Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, which noted “[n]o further information has been received by the Court.”
(R., pp.110-19.)

Thus, the district court dismissed Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction

petition. (R., pp.118, 120-21.)
Mr. Anderson filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s
Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Final Judgment. (R., pp.12224.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motions to
proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to
prepare an amended petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s Motions To
Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant, Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, And Extend His Time
To Prepare An Amended Petition
A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his
time to prepare an amended petition.

The district court did not recognize

Mr. Anderson’s right to self-representation. Mr. Anderson had a right to proceed pro se.
As a corollary to his right to self-representation, Mr. Anderson had a right to dismiss
court-appointed counsel. The district court abused its discretion when it denied those
motions because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion
to extend his time to prepare an amended petition. Because Mr. Anderson chose to
proceed pro se but was not present at the status conference, he needed a continuance
to exercise his right to self-representation, and being left unable to exercise that right
meant Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial of the motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Decisions relating to whether to grant or deny a motion for continuance are within

the discretion of the district court. See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567 (2008);
Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 131 (Ct. App. 2014). When an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether
the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district
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court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the district court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
“Additionally, the denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of discretion only if the
defendant can show his substantial rights have been prejudiced.” Payne, 146 Idaho at
567.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s
Motion To Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to proceed as a pro se litigant.

The district court did not recognize

Mr. Anderson’s right to proceed pro se. Thus, the district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards when it denied the motion.
Although it does not appear Idaho’s appellate courts have specifically addressed
whether there is a right to proceed pro se in post-conviction proceedings, the Idaho
Supreme Court has recognized a right to self-representation in other civil cases. See
Weston v. Gritman Mem’l Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 720 (1978) (“We recognize the inherent
right of a natural person to represent himself Pro se, but this right does not extend to
representation of other persons or corporations.”); see also Idaho State Bar Ass’n v.
Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 102 Idaho 672, 676 (1981) (same).
While the Idaho Supreme Court has not expressly named the source of the right
to self-representation in civil cases, the right to proceed pro se seems to be drawn from
the common law. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit put it,
“[t]he origins of the right to appear for oneself in civil proceedings derive from a number
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of sources, all deeply rooted in our history and culture.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d
553, 557 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the background of the statutory right to selfrepresentation in federal civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1654).2
The common law right to self-representation stems from 13th-century English law.
Cf. VanWormer, 60 Vand. L. Rev. at 987 (“The right to represent oneself in the federal
courts can be traced to medieval England.”). The Magna Carta provides: “We will sell to
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.” Magna Carta
(1297) § XXIX, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1cc1929/25/9/section/
XXIX.

Further, the Iannaccone Court noted that, “[b]y the middle of the thirteenth

century, lawyers so monopolized the courts in London that the King was forced to
decree that, except in a few special causes, litigants were entitled to plead their own
cases without lawyers.” Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 557.
The right to self-representation carried over to the American legal system.
During the American colonial period, “mistrust of lawyers made appearance in court
without benefit of counsel the preferred course,” and “the legal process still remained
sufficiently simple to permit persons whether rich or poor to plead their own causes.” Id.
Further, “[c]olonial peoples’ notions of their own individual rights and their reliance on
themselves were part of the movement away from religious authority and towards
religious freedom,” and colonial Americans’ “broad literacy and . . . political involvement
in their democratic institutions transformed the average American into a citizen-lawyer.”

See generally Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out
Of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 877, 932-35 (2012) (containing additional background on
the right to self-representation); Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Comment, Help At Your
Fingerprints: A Twenty-First Century Response To The Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 Vand.
L. Rev. 983, 987-88 (2007) (same).
2
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Id. The Second Circuit wrote the notion was “perhaps best expressed by Thomas
Paine, arguing in 1777 for a Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, who said that to plead
one’s cause was ‘a natural right,’ pleading through counsel was merely an ‘appendage’
to the natural right of self-representation.” Id.
While the right to proceed pro se in civil actions in federal courts is now
guaranteed by federal statute, see id. at 556, there is apparently no corresponding
Idaho statute expressly codifying the right to self-representation in civil cases.
However, Idaho law provides “[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not
provided for in these complied laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.”
I.C. § 73-116; see Idaho Const. art. XXI, § 2 (“All laws now in force in the territory of
Idaho which are not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire
by their own limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”).
English statutes in force on January 4, 1864, “when the provision contained in
I.C. s 73-116 was first enacted . . . are included in the received ‘common law.’” See Our
Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 91 Idaho 407, 411 (1967) (McQuade, J., concurring in the
result). Because section XXIX of the Magna Carta was in force in 1864, the right to selfrepresentation derived from its provision that “we will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either Justice or Right” is part of the § 73-116 received common law.
Thus, Mr. Anderson had a common law right to self-representation in his postconviction proceeding, like any other litigant in a civil case in Idaho. However, the
district court denied Mr. Anderson’s motion to proceed as a pro se litigant without
recognizing the denial would deprive him of his right to self-representation.
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(See

R., p.108; Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.1-9.)

Because the district court did not act

consistently with the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion
when it denied the motion to proceed as a pro se litigant. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at
600. Thus, the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Anderson’s motion to proceed pro se
should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow Mr. Anderson to
exercise his right to self-representation.
D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s
Motion To Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel.

The corollary to the right to self-

representation in civil cases is the right to dismiss counsel. Indeed, with respect to the
statutory right to self-representation in federal court, the Second Circuit observed the
party seeking to assert the right “must clearly and unequivocally discharge any lawyer
previously retained.” Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558. The comments to Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16 provide that “[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at
any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.”
I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 4.
While the comments to Rule 1.16 also state “[w]hether a client can discharge
appointed counsel may depend on applicable law,” I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 5, Mr. Anderson
submits the restrictions on discharging appointed counsel that apply to defendants in
criminal cases do not apply to himself or other post-conviction petitioners.
The right to self-representation in criminal cases is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
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818 (1975). The United States Supreme Court in Faretta acknowledged “the right of an
accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court’s
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and
imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at
832. Because an accused choosing to proceed pro se “relinquishes, as a purely factual
matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” the Faretta
Court held “in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and voluntarily
forgo those relinquished benefits.” Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
accused “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In light of Faretta, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that to be valid, a waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by a defendant in a criminal case choosing to
proceed pro se “must have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64 (2003). The Idaho Supreme Court has identified
“contemporaneous Faretta warnings” as “perhaps the most prudent means to ensure
the defendant’s grasp of the disadvantages of self-representation,” but also clarified it
would “look to the record as a whole to determine if a [criminal defendant] knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right.” State v. Dalrymple, 144
Idaho 628, 634 (2007).
Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, which are civil in nature. See Murphy v. State,
156 Idaho 389, 394-95 (2013). Under Idaho Supreme Court precedent, there would be
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no danger that a post-conviction petitioner choosing to go pro se would lose the benefits
of a constitutional right to counsel. Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Thus, based on the
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, the constitutionally-mandated restrictions on
defendants in criminal cases do not apply to post-conviction petitioners seeking to
discharge appointed counsel. This approach is in accord with the Second Circuit’s
approach to the federal statutory right to self-representation in civil cases: the
Iannaccone Court did not mention Faretta-type warnings among the “qualifications”
placed on the right. See Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558.
Here, the district court denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel on
the basis Mr. Anderson “doesn’t really have a right to counsel on the post-conviction.
He can’t maintain a claim for ineffective assistance.” (See Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.46.)

But even though Mr. Anderson could not raise a valid claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel against his post-conviction counsel under the Idaho Supreme
Court’s decisions, see Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, that does not negate his right to
discharge counsel. See I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 4. Because the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion
when it denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel. See Hedger, 115 Idaho
at 600.

The district court’s order denying Mr. Anderson’s motion to dismiss court-

appointed counsel should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow
Mr. Anderson to discharge his post-conviction counsel.
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E.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s
Motion To Extend His Time To Prepare An Amended Petition
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied the

motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition.

Because Mr. Anderson

chose to proceed pro se but was not present at the status conference, he needed a
continuance to exercise his right to self-representation. Because he was left unable to
exercise his right to self-representation, Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were
prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend time to prepare petition.
When reviewing the denial of a request for continuance, Idaho’s appellate courts
have examined the circumstances surrounding the request.

See, e.g., Everhart v.

Washington Cnty. Road & Bridge Dep’t, 130 Idaho 273, 275-76 (1997); Gubler v. Boe,
120 Idaho 294, 296-97 (1991). As noted above, “the denial of a motion for continuance
is an abuse of discretion only if the defendant can show his substantial rights have been
prejudiced.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 567.
Here, the surrounding circumstances indicate the district court abused its
discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend time to prepare petition.
Mr. Anderson submitted his motions for mailing before the deadline to respond to the
district court’s notice of intent to dismiss. (See R., p.106.) In the motions, Mr. Anderson
had unequivocally expressed his intention to proceed pro se. (R., p.104.) However,
Mr. Anderson was not present at the status conference where the district court denied
his motions. (R., p.107.) Thus, because Mr. Anderson chose to proceed pro se but
was not present at the status conference, he needed a continuance to exercise his right
to self-representation.
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Further, Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend time to prepare petition stated he
wanted more time to “prepare petition in support of his post conviction relief with
forthcoming evidence of additional witnesses, and documentation from both Canyon
County Medical and Detention Centers.” (R., p.105.) While Mr. Anderson had been
granted two prior continuances to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss (R., pp.95,
102), those continuances had been requested by post-conviction counsel (R., pp.92,
99), not by Mr. Anderson himself. Post-conviction counsel ultimately did not respond to
the notice of intent to dismiss.

(See R., p.117; Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25.)

Further, the district court dismissed Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction petition the same
day it denied his motions. (R., pp.108, 110-18.) Thus, the denial of the motion to
extend his time to prepare an amended petition meant Mr. Anderson was unable to
exercise his right to self-representation and file an amended petition or other response
to the notice of intent to dismiss.
The surrounding circumstances therefore indicate Mr. Anderson’s substantial
rights were prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend time to prepare petition. Cf.
Everhart, 130 Idaho at 275-76. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it
denied the motion. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 567. The district court’s order denying
Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition should be
reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow Mr. Anderson an extension of
time to prepare an amended petition or other response to the notice of intent to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court reverse the
district court’s order and judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, reverse the
district court’s order denying his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss courtappointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended petition, and remand the
matter to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2016.

_________/s/________________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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